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EXOMe

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28 SEP 1983

26 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Computer Security Discussion with IC Staff

1. During the afternoon of 13 September 1983 I visited the IC staff to discuss computer security with [REDACTED] at his request. Also in attendance were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the IC Staff.

2. This discussion was prompted by the activities of [REDACTED] in her Community security study efforts. [REDACTED] was interested in security issues from a CIA/DDA perspective and particularly an assessment of security issues vis-a-vis the CIA and the Community.

3. The discussion was broad and not concerned with specific details of computer security within the Agency. I stated that I believed that computer security in the Agency was in good shape. Various security safeguards [REDACTED] provide a reasonably secure computer environment. With respect to organizational relationships I explained that OS/ISSG establishes policies and regulations and that ODP implements them. There is a very good working relationship between OS and ODP on computer security matters.

4. [REDACTED] explained the current status of the [REDACTED] effort. The current game plan calls for briefings to be presented to high level individuals in the IC on the five areas of [REDACTED] study. These are being prepared by the various working groups within the Community study.

5. The security aspects of interfaces within the Community were discussed. I stated that the problems [REDACTED] could be addressed technically once requirements are known. The first step to be taken is for the CIA (primarily the DDO and DDI) to determine what information it wants to "exchange" and what restrictions are on that information. Once that is determined, technical methods of enforcing the restrictions can be applied. Methods such as [REDACTED] can be assessed for use after requirements are known.

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6. Several other security matters were generally discussed. The one additional area I noted was that of Personnal/Professional computers, word processors, and the magnetic storage media used with them. The large central system/data bases receive enough attention and are controlled enough to make them secure. "Local" DP equipment is much less controlled and therefore potentially presents a higher risk.

STAT 7. Finally, because CAMS-II has been designated as a critical system, I said I would be glad to discuss security within CAMS-I and the CAMS-II (P/S) with [redacted] at his convience. He said he would be in touch.

STAT

[redacted]

Distribution:

- STAT
- 1 - CAMS/Div/Chrono
 - 1 - DD/ODP
 - 1 - DDA/MS
 - 1 - ICS/P/
 - 1 - OS/ISS
- [redacted]

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